ISBN: 9783832415686

Facts and Explanations Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: ¿Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, e… Mehr…

Facts and Explanations Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: ¿Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia¿s success.¿ (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian ¿emerging markets¿. Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst ¿crony capitalism¿. Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely ¿a few small glitches in the road¿. Moody¿s and Standard and Poor¿s had upgraded the Philippines¿ long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand¿s situation to Mexico¿s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997:¿Thailand¿s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany¿. The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in ¿Foreign Affairs¿ was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation of the Asian financial crisis states that the affected countries suffered from constantly deteriorating fundamentals, such as worsening cur-rent account deficits, growing dependence on short-term loans, slowing export growth, and a rising share of non-performing loans. This made a crisis inevitable. Proponents of this explanation believe the Asian countries were ruled by ¿crony capitalism¿. Implicit and explicit government guarantees of loans led to over-investment and to investment in non-tradable and risky sectors, such as real estate and the stock market. This created an asset bubble, which eventually burst and dragged the over-leveraged financial intermediaries down with it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that borrowed funds were largely de-nominated in U.S. dollars. The run on the currency and the subsequent abandon of the exchange rate peg gave rise to a skyrocketing debt burden in terms of domestic currency and caused a further spread of bankruptcies.6 Although the proponents of the crony capitalism explanation acknowledge that market might have overreacted, they argue that the exchange rate crisis was fully warranted by fundamentals and not entirely caused by market irrationality. The second explanation blames the outbreak and the spread of the financial crisis in Asia on the intrinsic instability of international lending. According to this explanation, the Asian economies suffered from a state of international illiquidity when the crisis struck. This means that short-term foreign currency obligations exceeded available assets. The countries were therefore vulnerable to runs by their international creditors. Each creditor withdrawing their funds acted ration-ally, as he knew he would incur losses if he failed to withdraw his funds in the case of a financial panic. The change in investors¿ sentiments succeeded in devastating the Asian economies because they had recently opened the domestic financial markets. Countries with worse banking problems and a higher degree of corruption, like China, Vietnam, and Pakistan, could shield themselves from the crisis because their capital account had not been liberalized prior to the crisis. Jeffrey Sachs and Steven Radelet refer to the Asian financial crisis as a ¿crisis of success¿ where international investors¿ exuberance first led to a lending boom. Once the vulnerability of Asian economies to external shocks was discovered, exuberance turned into panic and investors withdrew their funds leaving the affected economies ravaged. According to this reasoning, the behaviour led to a fundamentally unnecessary crisis. As proponents of the financial panic hypothesis insist, Asian economies showed all signs of following a sustainable path of economic development. This paper analyzes these two competing explanations for the five most affected countries of the Asian crisis: Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. It is motivated by the systemic implications of the Asian crisis for the stability and regulation of the world financial system. The moral hazard hypothesis implies that financial markets were effective, though belated, messengers of economic ills. This would mean that more liberalization and more transparency would help avoid future crises. The financial panic explanation, by contrast, calls for capital controls as long as an international lender of last resort does not exist. Bhagwati is one of the most prominent opponents of capital account liberalization. He argues that the gains of capital account liberalization are small4compared to the additional risk that the countries incur. If the financial panic hypothesis proved to be true, this would force the economics profession to reconsider the cherished virtues of free capital markets. This paper takes a moderate position and argues that economic development across the affected ¿Asian Tigers¿ was uneven and pre-existing weaknesses were so different that generalizations on the causes of the meltdown are not warranted. In the words of Barry Eichengreen, we argue that ¿not all tigers have the same stripes¿. The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reconstructs the most important developments leading to the Asian financial crisis and briefly describes the un-folding of the crisis in Thailand and the subsequent spread to other countries in the region. Chapter 3 presents two models of the Asian financial crisis according to the two different sets of explanation. The first model explains the Asian melt-down with moral hazard-induced over-investment, while the second model likens the Asian crisis to a financial panic caused by a loss of investors¿ confidence. In last section of chapter 3, we evaluate the different models. We find that the moral hazard explanation accurately describes the cases of Thailand and Korea, but does not conform to data for Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The missing evidence for the moral hazard model, however, does not prove the existence of an irrational financial panic, but suggests the crisis in Thailand may have precipitated a deterioration of economic fundamentals in neighbouring countries. Chapter 4 focuses specifically on these dynamic effects of the crisis. We consider two channels through which the crisis in Thailand could have induced crises in other developing countries: competitive pressure through third county trade linkages and pure contagion. We find evidence that the devaluation of the baht exerted competitive pressures on the economies of the region. At the same time, there is mixed evidence at best for the existence of herding behaviour of the financial markets. In summary, the paper demonstrates that for Thailand and Korea, the moral hazard model is supported by the evidence. The other countries were on a relatively sustainable path of economic development until the devaluation of the Thai baht raised the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange rate. This result supports calls for an effective international lender of last resort. Einleitung: Die Finanz- und Währungskrise, die 1997 in Asien ausbrach, überraschte die meisten Beobachter. In den 80er und 90er Jahren galten die asiatischen ¿Tiger¿ als Vorbilder effizienter wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. Noch im Frühjahr 1997 nahmen große amerikanische Rating-Agenturen einige der betroffenen Länder in eine bessere Risikoklasse auf und Morgan Stanleys Star-Analyst Barton Biggs schrieb noch im Januar 1997: ¿Thailand`s problem`s are cyclical, not secular. [..] On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the Euro and is healthier than Germany.¿ Diese Sichtweise änderte sich jedoch radikal während der zweiten Hälfte 1997. Die asiatische Länder, die zuvor gelobt worden waren, galten plötzlich als Hort schlimmster Vetternwirtschaft und Ineffizienz. Die Diplomarbeit ¿The Asian Financial Crisis: Facts and Explanations¿ nimmt eine Analyse der Finanzkrise in Asien vor und erklärt, wie es zu diesem radikalen Stimmungsumschwung kommen konnte. Mit Hilfe umfangreichen Datenmaterials wird zunächst eine Bestandsaufnahme der Krise vorgenommen. Als nächster Schritt werden zwei konkurrierende Modelle einer Finanzkrise vorgestellt: Ein Modell erklärt die Krise als eine klassische Überinvestitionskrise, die durch ¿moral hazard¿ auf Seiten der Unternehmen und der asiatischen Banken hervorgerufen bzw. verstärkt wurde. Das andere Modell sieht die Krise als eine Panikreaktion der Finanzmärkte, die prinzipiell gesunde Unternehmen und Banken in die Insolvenz trieb. Beide Theorien werden anhand von Länderstatistiken und Finanzmarktdaten auf ihre Plausibilität überprüft. Außerdem werden auf Möglichkeiten, durch institutionelle Neuerungen zukünftige Krisen zu vermeiden, hingewiesen. Diese Diplomarbeit ist für alle diejenigen Unternehmen relevant, die trotz der Finanzkrise weiter im asiatischen Wirtschaftsraum aktiv sein wollen. Für sie sind eine fundierte Kenntnis der Ursachen der Krise unerlässlich, um die gegenwärtige Situation und die wirtschaftliche Aussichten in den betroffenen Ländern besser beurteilen zu können. Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION - EAST ASIA`S FALL FROM GRACE1 2.THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND THE COURSE OF EVENTS5 2.1THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CRISIS5 2.1.1Trade, Growth, and Competition5 2.1.2The Financial Sector11 2.2ONSET AND SPREAD OF THE CRISIS17 3ECONOMIC MODELS OF THE CRISIS 20 3.1 OVER-INVESTMENT AND MORAL HAZARD21 3.1.1General Considerations21 3.1.2A Theoretical Framework24 3.2FINANCIAL PANIC33 3.2.1General Considerations33 3.2.2A Theoretical Framework35 3.3EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT MODELS41 3.3.1Expected Behavior of Key Indicators41 3.3.2Empirical Validity44 3.3.3Concluding Remarks56 4.THE DYNAMICS OF THE CRISIS58 4.1GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS58 4.2SPILLOVER EFFECTS - A MODEL OF CONTAGIOUS DEVALUATIONS59 4.3CONTAGION64 4.4EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT MODELS66 4.4.1An Empirical Measure of Trade Linkage66 4.4.2Empirical Evidence of Herding Behavior67 4.4.3Concluding Remarks67 5.CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK68 6.REFERENCES71 7.APPENDIX80 7.1Chronology Of The Crisis80 7.2Mathematical Appendix84 7.2.1Derivation of Equation 19, Chapter 3.184 7.2.2Derivation of Equation 28, Chapter 3.184 7.3Statistical Appendix87 The Asian Financial Crisis: Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: ¿Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia¿s success.¿ (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian ¿emerging markets¿. Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst ¿crony capitalism¿. Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely ¿a few small glitches in the road¿. Moody¿s and Standard and Poor¿s had upgraded the Philippines¿ long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand¿s situation to Mexico¿s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997:¿Thailand¿s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany¿. The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in ¿Foreign Affairs¿ was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation of the Asian financial crisis states that the affected countries suffered from constantly deteriorating fundamentals, such as worsening cur-rent account deficits, growing dependence on short-term loans, slowing export growth, and a rising share of non-performing loans. This mad, Diplomica Verlag<

ISBN: 9783832415686

Facts and Explanations Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: ¿Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, e… Mehr…

Facts and Explanations Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: ¿Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia¿s success.¿ (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian ¿emerging markets¿. Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst ¿crony capitalism¿. Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely ¿a few small glitches in the road¿. Moody¿s and Standard and Poor¿s had upgraded the Philippines¿ long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand¿s situation to Mexico¿s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997:¿Thailand¿s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany¿. The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in ¿Foreign Affairs¿ was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation of the Asian financial crisis states that the affected countries suffered from constantly deteriorating fundamentals, such as worsening cur-rent account deficits, growing dependence on short-term loans, slowing export growth, and a rising share of non-performing loans. This made a crisis inevitable. Proponents of this explanation believe the Asian countries were ruled by ¿crony capitalism¿. Implicit and explicit government guarantees of loans led to over-investment and to investment in non-tradable and risky sectors, such as real estate and the stock market. This created an asset bubble, which eventually burst and dragged the over-leveraged financial intermediaries down with it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that borrowed funds were largely de-nominated in U.S. dollars. The run on the currency and the subsequent abandon of the exchange rate peg gave rise to a skyrocketing debt burden in terms of domestic currency and caused a further spread of bankruptcies.6 Although the proponents of the crony capitalism explanation acknowledge that market might have overreacted, they argue that the exchange rate crisis was fully warranted by fundamentals and not entirely caused by market irrationality. The second explanation blames the outbreak and the spread of the financial crisis in Asia on the intrinsic instability of international lending. According to this explanation, the Asian economies suffered from a state of international illiquidity when the crisis struck. This means that short-term foreign currency obligations exceeded available assets. The countries were therefore vulnerable to runs by their international creditors. Each creditor withdrawing their funds acted ration-ally, as he knew he would incur losses if he failed to withdraw his funds in the case of a financial panic. The change in investors¿ sentiments succeeded in devastating the Asian economies because they had recently opened the domestic financial markets. Countries with worse banking problems and a higher degree of corruption, like China, Vietnam, and Pakistan, could shield themselves from the crisis because their capital account had not been liberalized prior to the crisis. Jeffrey Sachs and Steven Radelet refer to the Asian financial crisis as a ¿crisis of success¿ where international investors¿ exuberance first led to a lending boom. Once the vulnerability of Asian economies to external shocks was discovered, exuberance turned into panic and investors withdrew their funds leaving the affected economies ravaged. According to this reasoning, the behaviour led to a fundamentally unnecessary crisis. As proponents of the financial panic hypothesis insist, Asian economies showed all signs of following a sustainable path of economic development. This paper analyzes these two competing explanations for the five most affected countries of the Asian crisis: Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. It is motivated by the systemic implications of the Asian crisis for the stability and regulation of the world financial system. The moral hazard hypothesis implies that financial markets were effective, though belated, messengers of economic ills. This would mean that more liberalization and more transparency would help avoid future crises. The financial panic explanation, by contrast, calls for capital controls as long as an international lender of last resort does not exist. Bhagwati is one of the most prominent opponents of capital account liberalization. He argues that the gains of capital account liberalization are small4compared to the additional risk that the countries incur. If the financial panic hypothesis proved to be true, this would force the economics profession to reconsider the cherished virtues of free capital markets. This paper takes a moderate position and argues that economic development across the affected ¿Asian Tigers¿ was uneven and pre-existing weaknesses were so different that generalizations on the causes of the meltdown are not warranted. In the words of Barry Eichengreen, we argue that ¿not all tigers have the same stripes¿. The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reconstructs the most important developments leading to the Asian financial crisis and briefly describes the un-folding of the crisis in Thailand and the subsequent spread to other countries in the region. Chapter 3 presents two models of the Asian financial crisis according to the two different sets of explanation. The first model explains the Asian melt-down with moral hazard-induced over-investment, while the second model likens the Asian crisis to a financial panic caused by a loss of investors¿ confidence. In last section of chapter 3, we evaluate the different models. We find that the moral hazard explanation accurately describes the cases of Thailand and Korea, but does not conform to data for Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The missing evidence for the moral hazard model, however, does not prove the existence of an irrational financial panic, but suggests the crisis in Thailand may have precipitated a deterioration of economic fundamentals in neighbouring countries. Chapter 4 focuses specifically on these dynamic effects of the crisis. We consider two channels through which the crisis in Thailand could have induced crises in other developing countries: competitive pressure through third county trade linkages and pure contagion. We find evidence that the devaluation of the baht exerted competitive pressures on the economies of the region. At the same time, there is mixed evidence at best for the existence of herding behaviour of the financial markets. In summary, the paper demonstrates that for Thailand and Korea, the moral hazard model is supported by the evidence. The other countries were on a relatively sustainable path of economic development until the devaluation of the Thai baht raised the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange rate. This result supports calls for an effective international lender of last resort. Einleitung: Die Finanz- und Währungskrise, die 1997 in Asien ausbrach, überraschte die meisten Beobachter. In den 80er und 90er Jahren galten die asiatischen ¿Tiger¿ als Vorbilder effizienter wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. Noch im Frühjahr 1997 nahmen große amerikanische Rating-Agenturen einige der betroffenen Länder in eine bessere Risikoklasse auf und Morgan Stanleys Star-Analyst Barton Biggs schrieb noch im Januar 1997: ¿Thailand`s problem`s are cyclical, not secular. [..] On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the Euro and is healthier than Germany.¿ Diese Sichtweise änderte sich jedoch radikal während der zweiten Hälfte 1997. Die asiatische Länder, die zuvor gelobt worden waren, galten plötzlich als Hort schlimmster Vetternwirtschaft und Ineffizienz. Die Diplomarbeit ¿The Asian Financial Crisis: Facts and Explanations¿ nimmt eine Analyse der Finanzkrise in Asien vor und erklärt, wie es zu diesem radikalen Stimmungsumschwung kommen konnte. Mit Hilfe umfangreichen Datenmaterials wird zunächst eine Bestandsaufnahme der Krise vorgenommen. Als nächster Schritt werden zwei konkurrierende Modelle einer Finanzkrise vorgestellt: Ein Modell erklärt die Krise als eine klassische Überinvestitionskrise, die durch ¿moral hazard¿ auf Seiten der Unternehmen und der asiatischen Banken hervorgerufen bzw. verstärkt wurde. Das andere Modell sieht die Krise als eine Panikreaktion der Finanzmärkte, die prinzipiell gesunde Unternehmen und Banken in die Insolvenz trieb. Beide Theorien werden anhand von Länderstatistiken und Finanzmarktdaten auf ihre Plausibilität überprüft. Außerdem werden auf Möglichkeiten, durch institutionelle Neuerungen zukünftige Krisen zu vermeiden, hingewiesen. Diese Diplomarbeit ist für alle diejenigen Unternehmen relevant, die trotz der Finanzkrise weiter im asiatischen Wirtschaftsraum aktiv sein wollen. Für sie sind eine fundierte Kenntnis der Ursachen der Krise unerlässlich, um die gegenwärtige Situation und die wirtschaftliche Aussichten in den betroffenen Ländern besser beurteilen zu können. Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION - EAST ASIA`S FALL FROM GRACE1 2.THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND THE COURSE OF EVENTS5 2.1THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CRISIS5 2.1.1Trade, Growth, and Competition5 2.1.2The Financial Sector11 2.2ONSET AND SPREAD OF THE CRISIS17 3ECONOMIC MODELS OF THE CRISIS 20 3.1 OVER-INVESTMENT AND MORAL HAZARD21 3.1.1General Considerations21 3.1.2A Theoretical Framework24 3.2FINANCIAL PANIC33 3.2.1General Considerations33 3.2.2A Theoretical Framework35 3.3EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT MODELS41 3.3.1Expected Behavior of Key Indicators41 3.3.2Empirical Validity44 3.3.3Concluding Remarks56 4.THE DYNAMICS OF THE CRISIS58 4.1GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS58 4.2SPILLOVER EFFECTS - A MODEL OF CONTAGIOUS DEVALUATIONS59 4.3CONTAGION64 4.4EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT MODELS66 4.4.1An Empirical Measure of Trade Linkage66 4.4.2Empirical Evidence of Herding Behavior67 4.4.3Concluding Remarks67 5.CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK68 6.REFERENCES71 7.APPENDIX80 7.1Chronology Of The Crisis80 7.2Mathematical Appendix84 7.2.1Derivation of Equation 19, Chapter 3.184 7.2.2Derivation of Equation 28, Chapter 3.184 7.3Statistical Appendix87 The Asian Financial Crisis: Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: ¿Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia¿s success.¿ (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian ¿emerging markets¿. Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst ¿crony capitalism¿. Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely ¿a few small glitches in the road¿. Moody¿s and Standard and Poor¿s had upgraded the Philippines¿ long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand¿s situation to Mexico¿s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997:¿Thailand¿s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany¿. The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in ¿Foreign Affairs¿ was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation of the Asian financial crisis states that the affected countries suffered from constantly deteriorating fundamentals, such as worsening cur-rent account deficits, growing dependence on short-term loans, slowing export growth, and a rising share of non-performing loans. This m, Diplomica Verlag<

ISBN: 3832415688

Pappbilderbuch, [EAN: 9783832415686], Diplomica, Diplomica, Book, [PU: Diplomica], Diplomica, 541686, Kategorien, 187254, Biografien & Erinnerungen, 120, Börse & Geld, 403434, Business & … Mehr…

Pappbilderbuch, [EAN: 9783832415686], Diplomica, Diplomica, Book, [PU: Diplomica], Diplomica, 541686, Kategorien, 187254, Biografien & Erinnerungen, 120, Börse & Geld, 403434, Business & Karriere, 287621, Comics & Mangas, 124, Computer & Internet, 11063821, Erotik, 340583031, Esoterik, 288100, Fachbücher, 142, Fantasy & Science Fiction, 548400, Film, Kunst & Kultur, 122, Freizeit, Haus & Garten, 13690631, Geschenkbücher, 5452843031, Jugendbücher, 118310011, Kalender, 5452736031, Kinderbücher, 189528, Kochen & Genießen, 287480, Krimis & Thriller, 420222031, Liebesromane, 117, Literatur & Fiktion, 189312, Medizin, 121, Naturwissenschaften & Technik, 143, Politik & Geschichte, 536302, Ratgeber, 572682, Recht, 298002, Reise & Abenteuer, 340513031, Religion & Glaube, 403432, Schule & Lernen, 3234481, Sozialwissenschaft, 298338, Sport & Fitness, 186606, Bücher, 54071011, Genres, 60447011, Architektur, Technik & Ingenieurswesen, 66034011, Belletristik, 56797011, Biografien & Erinnerungen, 58173011, Business, Karriere & Geld, 65981011, Comics, Mangas & Graphic Novels, 62991011, Computer & Internet, 54072011, Eltern & Familie, 57127011, Fantasy & Science Fiction, 65677011, Freizeit, Haus & Garten, 65140011, Geschichte, 64617011, Gesundheit, Geist & Körper, 59283011, Jugendbücher, 53817011, Kalender, 61180011, Kinderbücher, 64085011, Kochen & Genießen, 68333011, Krimis & Thriller, 59670011, Kunst & Fotografie, 54127011, Lernen & Nachschlagen, 55555011, Liebesromane & -erzählungen, 56535011, Medizin, 53965011, Musiknoten, 65108011, Outdoor, Umwelt & Natur, 63925011, Recht, 58645011, Reise & Abenteuer, 54682011, Religion & Esoterik, 69028011, Sachbücher, 65636011, Schwul & Lesbisch, 58390011, Sport & Fitness, 64226011, Unterhaltung & Kultur, 56047011, Wissenschaft, 52044011, Fremdsprachige Bücher<

1999, ISBN: 9783832415686

Facts and Explanations, eBooks, eBook Download (PDF), Auflage, [PU: diplom.de], [ED: 1], diplom.de, 1999

1999, ISBN: 9783832415686

Facts and Explanations, [ED: 1], Auflage, eBook Download (PDF), eBooks, [PU: diplom.de]